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Judicial Review of Public Utility Commissions† 
JONATHAN ARMIGER∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Indiana Supreme Court recently resolved a dispute between a manufacturer 
and an electric utility company concerning rates for electricity usage.1 Although the 
dispute involved interpretation of a contract for electricity, the majority of the 
court’s opinion was devoted to an entirely separate issue: the appropriate standard 
of review2 to be used by appellate courts in reviewing decisions of the Indiana 
Utility Regulatory Commission.3 Finding deferential review appropriate, the 
Indiana Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals and 
affirmed the decision of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission.4 The Indiana 
Supreme Court—unlike the Indiana Court of Appeals—declined to substitute its 
judgment for that of the Commission.5 That determination—the applicable standard 
of review—cost the electric utility company millions of dollars.6 
The high stakes involved in standard-of-review determinations concerning 
decisions by public utility commissions abound in courts across the country.7 Every 
state has a public utility commission,8 and every appellate court in every state uses 
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 1. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. 2009). 
 2. Standards of review signify the degree of deference to be given by reviewing courts 
to decisions under review. Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of 
Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 47 (2000). The more 
deference given, the less likely that decision will be overturned on appeal. See id. at 47–48. 
“Standards of review can be established by constitution, statute, court rule, or judicial 
decree.” Richard H.W. Maloy, “Standards of Review”—Just a Tip of the Icicle, 77 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 603, 609 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 3. See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 907 N.E.2d at 1015–18. 
 4. Id. at 1020. 
 5. See id.; N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 881 N.E.2d 1065, 1071 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2008), vacated, 907 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. 2009). 
 6. See LORAINE L. SEYFRIED, IND. UTIL. REGULATORY COMM’N, COMPLAINTS FILED BY 
INDUSTRIAL CUSTOMERS OF INDIANA UTILITIES: JUPITER ALUMINUM CASE STUDY (2007), 
available at http://www.narucpartnerships.org/Documents/Indiana_utility_operations 
_for_industrial_customers_eng_Loraine_Seyfried.pdf (stating that the disputed amount of 
electrical charges involved millions of dollars); Andy Grimm, Indiana Supreme Court Rules 
Against NIPSCO, POST-TRIB. (Nw. Ind.), June 25, 2009, at A5 (stating that the Indiana 
Supreme Court’s decision saved U.S. Steel a “bundle” on its electric bill). 
 7. “Public utility commissions” is a general term meant to encapsulate the variety of 
labels attached to the state boards or commissions that regulate public utilities in each state. 
FRED BOSSELMAN, JOEL B. EISEN, JIM ROSSI, DAVID B. SPENCE & JACQUELINE WEAVER, 
ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 49 (2d ed. 2006).  
 8. See State Commissions, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY 
COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naruc.org/commissions.cfm. 
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standards of review to guide its review of public utility commission decisions.9 
However, notwithstanding the fact that courts have long been employing standards 
of review in their review of public utility commission decisions—after all, public 
utility commissions have existed for more than a century10 and standards of review 
have been used since the beginning of American jurisprudence11—questions still 
persist concerning the proper interpretation and application of public utility 
commission reviewing standards.12 While many of these questions arise from the 
inherent difficulties involved in interpreting and applying standards of review 
generally,13 the problem is especially acute in judicial review of public utility 
commissions because (1) public utility commissions exercise broad grants of 
authority and assume various roles in regulating public utilities, thus increasing the 
difficulty involved in legally characterizing any given decision;14 and (2) the legal 
consequences of that characterization—most notably the applicable standard of 
review—are often unique to public utility commissions as opposed to trial courts or 
other administrative agencies.15  
This Note proposes a three-tiered, two-standard reviewing approach for 
determining the appropriate level of deference to be afforded public utility 
commissions as they undergo judicial review by appellate courts. The purpose of 
this 3-2 approach is to simplify and clarify the standard-of-review determinations 
that state courts continue to grapple with in the context of appeals from public 
utility commission decisions. The 3-2 approach is both a reflection and a 
refinement of current public utility commission reviewing standards. The 3-2 
approach utilizes three tiers of review to properly characterize the public utility 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See, e.g., In re Waikoloa Sanitary Sewer Co., 125 P.3d 484 (Haw. 2005); Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 904 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio 2009). 
 10. See Robert L. Bradley, The Origins of Political Electricity: Market Failure or 
Political Opportunism?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 59, 65–66 (1996); William K. Jones, Origins of the 
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870–1920, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 426, 431–32 (1979).  
 11. See Davis, supra note 2, at 47. 
 12. See, for example, N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. 
2009), predominately discussing public utility commission reviewing standards, and more 
recently continuing the discussion, Dep’t of Waterworks for Consol. City of Indianapolis v. 
Cmty. Sch. Corp. of S. Hancock Cnty., 933 N.E. 2d 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).  
 13. See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 234–36 (2009) (discussing the notoriously difficult task of 
interpreting and applying standards of review and their resultant misuse and 
misunderstanding).  
 14. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 907 N.E.2d at 1017–18 (discussing the public 
utility commission’s role in approving a contract between utilities and how it affects the 
legal characterization of the issue on appeal). 
 15. See id. at 1015 n.1 (comparing the similar, but different, statutory provisions relating 
to judicial review of public utility commissions with those of other administrative agencies). 
See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 1–3 (2d ed. 2006) 
(discussing the importance of analyzing how the law characterizes agency action and the 
legal consequences of that characterization).  
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commission decision and two standards to reflect the legal consequences of that 
characterization.  
In developing the 3-2 approach, this Note begins in Part I by examining the role, 
origin, and legal authority of public utility commissions. Part II then discusses 
standards of review, including their common formulations, their importance in 
appellate decision making, difficulties in their interpretation and application, and 
their relation to the types of questions presented on appeal. Part III then discusses 
judicial review of public utility commissions by first highlighting several 
preliminary considerations relating to the availability of judicial review and then 
surveying state public utility commission reviewing standards. Finally, Part III   
concludes with a discussion of the three-tiered, two-standard reviewing approach. 
I. PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS 
This Part briefly looks at the role, origin, and legal authority of public utility 
commissions. Before one can appreciate why a new reviewing approach is 
necessary and what that reviewing approach entails and why, one must understand 
what public utility commissions do, why they do it, and under what authority.  
A. The Role of Public Utility Commissions 
Public utility commissions regulate public utilities.16 Public utilities are privately 
owned and operated businesses that provide public services (e.g., transportation, 
communication, power, and sanitary services).17 To take advantage of the 
significant economies of scale inherent in public services, public utilities are 
afforded exclusive franchises to provide particular public services in particular 
territories, generally free from market competition, in exchange for increased 
governmental regulation.18 Public utility commissions are the primary source of 
state regulation of public utilities.19 Common regulations exercised by public utility 
commissions include control over the entry of new companies and the expansion of 
existing ones, control over service prices, and reliability controls aimed at ensuring 
services are available and of sufficient quality.20  
In regulating public utilities, public utility commissions assume various roles, 
exercising “both legislative and judicial powers.”21 They exercise their judicial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See generally Bradley, supra note 10, at 61–67; Jones, supra note 10, at 426–27, 
431–32.  
 17. Jones, supra note 10, at 426.  
 18. See id. at 426–27; Bradley, supra note 10, at 62. 
 19. See Bradley, supra note 10, at 61–67; Jones, supra note 10, at 426–27, 431–32. 
 20. Jones, supra note 10, at 426–27; see also CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR, BUREAU OF 
STATE AUDITS, REP. NO. 2004-118, PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION: SINCE THE JUDICIAL 
REVIEW ACT OF 1998, THE NUMBER OF PETITIONS SEEKING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMMISSION 
DECISIONS HAS INCREASED 35–38 (2005) [hereinafter CAL. STATE AUDITOR REPORT] 
(reporting on the self-ascribed purpose and mission of several public utility commissions). 
 21. In re Request for Serv. in Qwest’s Tofte Exch., 666 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2003); see also, e.g., IND. CODE § 8-1-1-3(e) (2010) (“On order of the commission any 
one (1) member of the commission, or an administrative law judge, may conduct a hearing, 
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power when they “conduct hearings [and] render findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.”22 For example, a public utility commission acts in a judicial capacity when 
it conducts an investigation to determine whether a regulated entity has violated a 
commission rule.23 Public utility commissions exercise their legislative powers 
when they promulgate rules and regulations affecting regulated industries,24 such as 
service standards.25 The various roles assumed by public utility commissions are 
important because appellate courts often look to the role assumed by a public utility 
commission to determine the applicable standard of review to be applied to a 
particular action or decision of that public utility commission.26 
B. The Origin of Public Utility Commissions 
Public utility commissions were not always the source of public-utility 
regulation. Local municipalities, and to some extent state legislators, were the 
primary source of public-utility regulation until state public utility commissions 
were ushered in at the beginning of the twentieth century.27 Public utility 
commissions owe their existence in large part to the political reform movements of 
the early twentieth century.28 Piecemeal legislation and regulation by state and local 
governments proved to be inadequate as regulation increased and local political 
factions vied for control.29 Public utility commissions were viewed as a solution to 
the partisan and often corrupt interference of state and local governments and the 
excesses of public utilities.30 Public utility commissions were viewed as 
“incorruptible, enlightened, and non-partisan agencies” exerting “just, impartial, 
and unprejudiced control of public service corporations and public utilities 
generally.”31 During this “honeymoon period of commission regulation,” the 
question of “who regulates the regulators” was not considered.32 Today, the 
question is not so much who regulates the regulators but to what extent the 
                                                                                                                 
or investigation, and take evidence therein, and report the same to the commission for its 
consideration and action . . . .”); IND. CODE § 8-1-1-3(g) (“The commission shall formulate 
rules necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter, and shall perform 
the duties imposed by law upon them.”); Potomac Edison Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 667 
S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2008) (recognizing that the public utility commission is charged with 
administrative, judicial, and legislative functions). 
 22. Simpson Cnty. Water Dist. v. City of Franklin, 872 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Ky. 1994). 
 23. CAL. STATE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 20, at 2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., 170 IND. ADMIN. CODE 4-1-1 to 4-1-30 (2010). 
 26. See CAL. STATE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 20, at 2; Qwest’s Tofte Exch., 666 
N.W.2d at 395 (“When the [public utility commission] acts in a legislative capacity, the 
standard of review is whether it exceeded its statutory authority; when the [public utility 
commission] acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, the standard of review is the substantial 
evidence test.”). 
 27. See Bradley, supra note 10, at 65–66; Jones, supra note 10, at 431–32.  
 28. See Bradley, supra note 10, at 64; Jones, supra note 10, at 432. 
 29. See Bradley, supra note 10, at 64; Jones, supra note 10, at 432. 
 30. See Bradley, supra note 10, at 64; Jones, supra note 10, at 432. 
 31. Bradley, supra note 10, at 64 (quoting GEORGE BROWN, THE GAS LIGHT COMPANY 
OF BALTIMORE: A STUDY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 104 (1936)). 
 32. Id. 
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regulators should be regulated. Judicial reviewing standards are a critical 
component of the answer to that question. 
C. The Legal Authority of Public Utility Commissions 
Statutes promulgated by state legislatures dictate the legal authority of public 
utility commissions.33 The legal authority of public utility commissions can be 
substantial, at times having the “force and effect of law.”34 When a public utility 
commission acts within the scope of its legal authority, its actions are often given a 
presumption of validity, which makes overcoming a decision by a public utility 
commission particularly difficult.35 Although public utility commissions have 
“sweeping authority to regulate public utilities,” they are nonetheless “creature[s] 
of statute,” and therefore, have only those powers granted to them by state 
legislatures.36 Statutes creating public utility commissions and defining the scope of 
their authority generally designate which industries are to be regulated and the 
types of regulations to be exerted over entities in those industries.37  
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This Part discusses standards of review, including their common formulations, 
their importance in appellate decision making, difficulties in their interpretation and 
application, and their relation to the types of questions presented on appeal. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. See, e.g., IND. CODE 8-1-1-1 to -15 (2010); see also Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. S. 
Ry. Co., 554 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tenn. 1977) (“Any authority exercised by the Public Service 
Commission must be as the result of an express grant of authority by statute or arise by 
necessary implication from the expressed statutory grant of power.”).  
 34. Office of Regulatory Staff v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 647 S.E.2d 223, 227 (S.C. 
2007); see also Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 217 (Tex. 2002). 
 35. See, e.g., In re Application of Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 761 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2008) (discussing a statutorily imposed presumption of validity under MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 462.25). 
 36. Commonwealth ex rel. Stumbo v. Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 243 S.W.3d 374, 378 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2007).  
 37. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 61. For example, the following statutory 
provision directs the public utility commission to issue rules and regulations to govern 
relations between public utilities and customers: 
The Commission shall establish reasonable rules and regulations to govern the 
relations between public utilities and any or all classes of their customers. 
Those rules and regulations shall cover the following subjects: (1) extension of 
service; (2) extension of credit; (3) deposits, including interest thereon; (4) 
billing procedures; (5) termination of service; (6) complaints; and (7) 
information and notice to customers of their rights under the rules. 
IND. CODE § 8-1-2-34.5(a). 
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A. Common Standards of Review 
There are at least thirty different standards of review,38 leading one judge to 
conclude, “there are more verbal formulas for the scope of appellate review . . . 
than there are distinctions actually capable of being drawn in the practice of 
appellate review.”39 Fortunately, many of these standards are merely variations of 
the most commonly employed standards.40 Unfortunately, state courts (as opposed 
to federal courts) are more likely to employ these variations, making any 
comparative analysis of state court reviewing standards particularly challenging.41  
The most commonly employed standards of review are de novo, clearly 
erroneous, substantial evidence, and abuse of discretion.42 In the context of 
appellate review of administrative decisions, another commonly employed standard 
of review is arbitrary and capricious.43 The amount of deference given by 
reviewing courts to the actions or decisions under review corresponds with these 
standards, with de novo imparting the least deference and abuse of discretion and 
arbitrary and capricious imparting the most.44  
Appellate courts reviewing decisions under a de novo standard afford no 
deference to those decisions.45 In fact, the Latin term “de novo” translates as 
“anew.”46 De novo review is most commonly applied to questions of law.47  
Substantial evidence review and clearly erroneous review are largely 
indistinguishable,48 although commentators have noted that clearly erroneous 
review is somewhat less deferential than substantial evidence review.49 Substantial 
evidence review and clearly erroneous review are most commonly applied to 
findings of fact.50 For the most part, a factual determination is supported by 
substantial evidence if that determination is supported by “relevant evidence that a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Maloy, supra note 2, at 610. See infra Part III.B for a similar finding concerning the 
number of public utility commission reviewing standards. 
 39. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 40. Peters, supra note 13, at 243. 
 41. See Maloy, supra note 2, at 611. 
 42. Peters, supra note 13, at 243. 
 43. See Kevin Casey, Jade Camara & Nancy Wright, Standards of Appellate Review in 
the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 287 (2001); Paul R. 
Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 
687 (2002). 
 44. Casey et al., supra note 43, at 287; Verkuil, supra note 43, at 689 (estimating a 
hypothesized affirmance rate of 40–50% for decisions reviewed de novo).  
 45. Peters, supra note 13, at 246. 
 46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (9th ed. 2009). 
 47. Peters, supra note 13, at 246. See infra Part II.D for a discussion of the various types 
of questions presented on appeal.  
 48. Peters, supra note 13, at 245–46. 
 49. Casey et al., supra note 43, at 308 (“Findings can be clearly erroneous even if 
supported by substantial evidence, but findings unsupported by substantial evidence are 
clearly erroneous.” (footnote omitted)); Verkuil, supra note 43, at 689 (estimating an 
affirmance rate of 70–80% for clearly erroneous and 75–85% for substantial evidence). 
 50. Peters, supra note 13, at 245. 
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reasonable person might accept as adequate to support [it].”51 Generally, a factual 
determination is clearly erroneous “when although there is evidence to support it, 
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”52  
Abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious reviewing standards are the 
most deferential.53 In the context of public utility commission decisions, they are 
often used interchangeably.54 Decisions have been termed arbitrary and capricious 
when they are unreasonable or without foundation in fact,55 the record does not and 
could not reasonably support them,56 they lack substantial and material evidence or 
are the result of clear error,57 or they are based on irrelevant factors or are not based 
on factors that the legislature has required them to be.58 Similarly, decisions have 
been termed the result of an abuse of discretion when they fall outside the range of 
reasonable and principled outcomes,59 lack adequate explanation, or are based on 
an error of law or erroneous factual finding.60 Abuse of discretion and arbitrary and 
capricious reviewing standards are often used in reviewing procedural matters.61 
B. Why Standards of Review Are Important 
Standards of review have been termed “the essential language of appeals”62 and 
the “keystone to court of appeals decision-making.”63 They are so important to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Regulatory Comm’n, 176 P.3d 667, 673 (Alaska 
2008). 
 52. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United 
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 
 53. Casey et al., supra note 43, at 287; Verkuil, supra note 43, at 689. 
 54. See, e.g., Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke Cnty. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 668 
S.E.2d 296, 297 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (permitting reversal of a decision if arbitrary or 
capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion); In re Application of Mich. Consol. 
Gas Co., 761 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (limiting reversal of rate-design 
decisions unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion); Dunn v. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n, 246 S.W.3d 788, 791 (Tex. App. 2008) (characterizing decisions as arbitrary 
and capricious or an abuse of discretion if unreasonable); see also Maloy, supra note 2, at 
610 n.60 (“Abuse of discretion is also known as deferential review and arbitrary and 
capricious.” (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)); Peters, supra note 13, at 244 (“In some 
jurisdictions, abuse of discretion is defined so that a reversal is warranted only if the trial 
court's decision was arbitrary or irrational.”). 
 55. Kan. Indus. Consumers Group, Inc. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 138 P.3d 338, 344 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
 56. Vacuum Truck Carriers of La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 12 So.3d 932, 937 
(La. 2009). 
 57. Jackson Mobilphone Co. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1993). 
 58. AEP Tex. Cent. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 286 S.W.3d 450, 466 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). 
 59. In re Application of Consumers Energy Co., 761 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). 
 60. Casey et al., supra note 43, at 311. 
 61. See Peters, supra note 13, at 243. 
 62. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
at  ix (3d ed. 1999). 
 63. MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 
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appeals process that many (if not most) appellate courts require parties to state the 
applicable standard in their briefs.64 In addition, most appellate courts discuss the 
applicable standard of review before proceeding to the merits.65 Standards of 
review enjoy prominence in the appellate review process because they serve many 
important policy objectives. Among other things, standards of review (1) balance 
judicial power among multiple decision makers, ensuring, on the one hand, that no 
single judge has uncontrollable and unreviewable power, and, on the other, that 
lower court and agency decisions are not meaningless exercises; (2) promote 
judicial economy by narrowing the scope of appellate review to prevent full-blown 
relitigation of lower-court or agency decisions; (3) provide consistency in decisions 
by ensuring that like cases are decided alike (e.g., cases involving questions of law 
will be decided similarly as will cases involving questions of fact); and (4) give 
notice to parties of the likelihood of success on appeal by ensuring that their 
expectations are commensurate with what can be achieved on appeal (e.g., parties 
contemplating appealing a decision know that they are more likely to succeed in 
overturning that decision if the decision is given little or no deference).66 Standards 
of review are particularly important in appeals from public utility commission 
decisions because public utility commissions are generally afforded a higher degree 
of deference than trial courts.67  
C. Difficulties in the Interpretation and Application of Standards of Review 
Despite their importance, standards of review are notoriously difficult to 
interpret and apply, which often leads to their misuse and misunderstanding.68 
Although standards of review have long been a fixture of American jurisprudence, 
articulation of them is relatively new.69 The typical standard-of-review reference, 
set out briefly at the beginning of an opinion, is of little help,70 because, for starters, 
                                                                                                                 
493 (2005). 
 64. Casey et al., supra note 43, at 281; see, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(B).  
 65. See, e.g., Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 904 N.E.2d 853, 856–57 
(Ohio 2009). 
 66. Peters, supra note 13, at 238–42. As one author put it, “[f]or the attorney 
contemplating an appeal . . . knowing the applicable standard is crucial.” Aaron J. 
Lockwood, The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing Standards of Appellate Review, 
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 709 (2007). Practitioners who do not heed standards of review 
“undermine their chances of obtaining a favorable judgment on appeal.” Casey et al., supra 
note 43, at 280 (discussing the importance of framing arguments in terms of the applicable 
standards of review). 
 67. See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (Ind. 2009); 
Davis, supra note 2, at 48. 
 68. Peters, supra note 13, at 234–36; see also Davis, supra note 2, at 49 (“The labels 
identifying the levels or intensity of appellate review sound deceptively simple, but not one 
of them admits of easy analysis.”); Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A 
Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 11, 12 (1994) (“Some courts invoke [standards of review] 
talismanically to authenticate the rest of their opinions. . . . Other courts use standards[s] of 
review to create an illusion of harmony between the appropriate result and the applicable 
law. . . . Finally, some courts disregard standard[s] of review in their analysis entirely.”). 
 69. Davis, supra note 2, at 47. 
 70. Lockwood, supra note 66, at 709. 
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there are just too many standards—at some point, distinctions drawn in the abstract 
cannot be applied in reality (i.e., there is a diminishing marginal return for each 
additional standard).71 Another problem is definitional, where, from one court to 
the next, definitions of particular standards of review—even common ones—vary, 
albeit subtly.72 As one author put it, “standard[s] of review [are] far easier to 
describe than to define,”73 and as a consequence, lawyers, judges, scholars, and 
academics construct their own definitions using metaphors and analogies to 
describe their purpose.74 Furthermore, it is not uncommon to find multiple 
standards of review thrown together with no clear indication under what 
circumstances a particular standard of review applies, or worse yet, what a 
particular standard of review entails.75 And lastly, despite the ease with which 
standards of review may be defined, within the context of complex factual 
scenarios and complicated legal issues, they are extremely difficult to apply.76 The 
3-2 approach described in this Note attempts to avoid these problems by using only 
two standards and using them in a framework that makes their interpretation and 
application as easy as possible. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  
 72. Compare Wash. State Attorney Gen.’s Office v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, 
116 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (defining arbitrary and capricious as “willful 
and unreasoning [action] taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances” 
(quoting Hillis v. Dep’t of Ecology, 932 P.2d 139, 144 (1997))), with Entergy Ark., Inc. v. 
Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 289 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (defining arbitrary and 
capricious as an action “not supportable on any rational basis, and something more than 
mere error”). See generally Richard M. Markus, A Better Standard for Reviewing Discretion, 
2004 UTAH L. REV. 1279 (discussing differing views of what constitutes an abuse of 
discretion). 
 73. Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. 
REV. 231, 232 (1991).  
 74. See Peters, supra note 13, at 234–35. 
 75. See, e.g., GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 790 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Crist v. 
Jaber, 908 So.2d 426, 430 (Fla. 2005), for the proposition that a public utility commission 
decision will be upheld if supported by competent substantial evidence and if not clearly 
erroneous); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Mont. Dept. of Pub. Serv., 725 P.2d 548, 553 
(Mont. 1986) (stating that a finding is not clearly erroneous if substantial evidence exists to 
support the finding); Jackson Mobilphone Co., Inc. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876 
S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that decisions not supported by substantial 
and material evidence are arbitrary and capricious); AEP Tex. Cent. Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 286 S.W.3d 450, 468 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
246 S.W.3d 324, 332 (Tex. App. 2008), for the proposition that a public utility commission 
decision will be overturned if not supported by substantial evidence, if arbitrary or 
capricious, or if characterized by an abuse of discretion); see also Maloy, supra note 2, at 
606 (“Not only may any standard of review apply to more than one issue in a case, more 
than one standard of review may be applied to any one issue.”).  
 76. Verkuil, supra note 43, at 681–82.  
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D. Categorizing Questions on Appeal 
Categorizing questions on appeal is where many appellate courts begin their 
reviewing process.77 This is so because the type of question under review often 
determines the applicable standard of review.78 Moreover, courts usually frame the 
standard of review in terms of the type of question presented on appeal.79 Questions 
presented on appeal are most often divided into three categories: questions of law,80 
questions of fact,81 and mixed questions of law and fact.82  
Questions of law include the creation, modification, or interpretation of law.83 
The law in question could be derived from constitutions, statutes, case law, 
administrative rules, or court rules.84 Questions of law are reviewed with limited 
deference (or in most cases with no deference).85 Questions of fact involve 
determinations of who, what, when, where, and how,86 and are usually reviewed 
with deference.87 Mixed questions of law and fact involve, among other things, 
application of law to facts.88 Mixed questions are sometimes reviewed deferentially 
and sometimes not.89 As with standards of review generally, the labels that identify 
the types of questions presented on appeal and their corresponding descriptions 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. See, e.g., N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 168 
P.3d 105, 110 (N.M. 2007) (stating that in reviewing public utility commission decisions the 
court begins by determining “whether the decision presents a question of law, a question of 
fact, or some combination of the two” (quoting Morningstar Water Users Ass’n v. N.M. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n, 904 P.2d 28, 31 (1995))). 
 78. Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 101, 103 (2005) (“The whole reason for labeling a question ‘law,’ ‘fact,’ or ‘mixed’ 
is to determine the standard of review on appeal . . . .”). 
 79. See, e.g., In re Otter Tail Power Co., 744 N.W.2d 594, 602 (S.D. 2008) (“The 
[public utility commission’s] findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Citizens Action Coal. of Indiana, Inc. v. PSI Energy, Inc., 894 N.E.2d 
1055, 1063–65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (interpreting applicable statutes to determine whether a 
public utility can recover construction costs for a facility while that facility is under 
construction). 
 81. See, e.g., Kan. Indus. Consumers Grp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 138 P.3d 338, 354–
57 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (considering whether utility intended to dismantle its retired 
facilities). 
 82. Warner, supra note 78, at 112; see, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
907 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (Ind. 2009) (categorizing public utility commission’s interpretation 
of a contract which it approved and subsequently interpreted as a mixed question of law and 
fact).  
 83. See Warner, supra note 78, at 112.  
 84. Id. at 113. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. at 115. 
 87. Id. at 116. 
 88. Id. at 129 (noting that mixed questions are commonly defined as application of law 
to facts even though such terminology is ambiguous); Casey et al., supra note 43, at 318–19. 
 89. See Casey et al., supra note 43, at 318–19. 
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mask the difficulties often involved in determining which category a particular 
question falls into.90 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS 
This Part discusses judicial review of public utility commissions: first, by 
highlighting several preliminary considerations relating to the availability of 
judicial review, and second, by surveying state public utility commission reviewing 
standards. It concludes with a discussion of the three-tiered, two-standard 
reviewing approach. 
A. The Availability of Judicial Review: Preliminary Considerations 
Judicial review of public utility commissions is dependent on statutory and 
constitutional provisions providing for such review.91 These provisions may 
contain conditions precedent to obtaining judicial review, by requiring, for 
example, that the dispute be ripe for review,92 that the decision of the public 
utility commission be final,93 or that the party seeking appeal has exhausted 
administrative remedies, such as rehearing.94 The provisions may dictate where 
appeals are heard (i.e., which court will entertain the appeal) or whether they are 
heard at all.95 The provisions may also delineate the scope of review,96 set out 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. See generally Warner, supra note 78, at 107 (discussing the difficulty courts have 
with drawing distinctions between questions of fact and questions of law).  
 91. 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 246 (2004); see also IND. CODE §§ 8-1-3-1 to -11 
(2010). An example of statutory language providing for judicial review of a public utility 
commission can be found in Indiana Code section 8-1-3-1, which provides: 
Any person, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, city, 
town, or public utility adversely affected by any final decision, ruling, or order 
of the commission may . . . appeal to the court of appeals of Indiana . . . with 
the right in the losing party or parties in the court of appeals to apply to the 
supreme court for a petition to transfer the cause to said supreme court as in 
other cases. 
IND. CODE § 8-1-3-1 (2010). 
 92. A dispute is ripe for review, for instance, when it “has reached, but has not passed, 
the point when the facts have developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful 
decision to be made.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (9th ed. 2009). 
 93. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 5 (West 2009) (permitting appeals “from 
any final decision, order or ruling” of the public utility commission). A decision is final “if it 
completely adjudicates the rights of the parties, leaving nothing further to be decided.” 
Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Energy Facilities Sitting Bd., 899 N.E.2d 829, 834 
(Mass. 2009). 
 94. 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 247 (2004 & Supp. 2010). 
 95. For example, in California, appeals are discretionary, not mandatory as in some 
states, and directed only to intermediate and final appellate courts, whereas in other states, 
such as New York, appeals are first directed to a trial court. CAL. STATE AUDITOR REPORT, 
supra note 20, at 39 tbl.A. 
 96. An example of statutory language delineating the scope of review can be found in 
Indiana Code section 8-1-3-7, which provides:  
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procedures for filing an appeal,97 and importantly, establish standards of review to 
be applied to decisions under review.98 While this Note focuses on standards of 
review as reflected in state court opinions, it is important to note that standards of 
review are just one aspect of judicial review of public utility commissions and are 
often a reflection of the judicial gloss put on statutory and constitutional provisions. 
B. State Survey of Public Utility Commission Reviewing Standards 
Standards of review are used in two senses: (1) to legally characterize issues on 
appeal and (2) to reflect the legal consequences of those characterizations.99 
Standards of review are as much concerned with classifying issues (e.g., as one of 
law or of fact) as they are with describing and defining the amount of deference to 
be afforded to lower-court or agency decisions on those issues (e.g., no-deference 
de novo review or deferential substantial evidence review).100 The following survey 
of state public utility commission reviewing standards encompasses both elements; 
that is, after listing the numerous standards used by state courts, it presents the most 
common questions or line of questions used by courts in classifying issues, and 
then the most common standards ascribed to those classifications.  
State public utility commission reviewing standards are numerous and vary from 
state to state. There are at least thirty different standards utilized by state courts in 
reviewing decisions of public utility commissions.101 The most common standards 
include (1) de novo, (2) clearly erroneous, (3) substantial evidence, (4) arbitrary 
and capricious, and (5) abuse of discretion.102 Other standards include (6) any 
evidence, (7) appreciable deference, (8) clear error, (9) clear weight, (10) 
competent evidence, (11) competent and material substantial evidence, (12) 
competent substantial evidence, (13) considerable deference, (14) due weight, (15) 
                                                                                                                 
No evidence beyond that contained in the record of the proceedings before the 
commission shall be considered or received by the court, except that in cases 
where issues of confiscation or of constitutional right are involved, the court, on 
its own motion or verified petition of a party, may order such additional 
evidence as it deems necessary for the determination of such issues to be taken 
before the commission and to be received at the hearing before the commission 
in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as the court shall order. 
IND. CODE § 8-1-3-7. 
 97. 73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 250 (2004). 
 98. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 8-1-3-1 (“An assignment of errors that the decision, ruling, or 
order of the commission is contrary to law shall be sufficient to present both the sufficiency 
of the facts found to sustain the decision, ruling, or order, and the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain the finding of facts upon which it was rendered.”). 
 99. See Hofer, supra note 73, at 233.  
 100. See id.  
 101. See Maloy, supra note 2, at 610, for a similar finding regarding state reviewing 
standards generally. 
 102. See, e.g., In re Narragansett Bay Comm'n Gen. Rate Filing, 808 A.2d 631, 635 (R.I. 
2002) (de novo); In re Waikoloa Sanitary Sewer Co., 125 P.3d 484, 491 (Haw. 2005) 
(clearly erroneous); Dunn v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 890 A.2d 269, 270 (Me. 2006) (substantial 
evidence); Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 899 N.E.2d 
829, 834 (Mass. 2009) (arbitrary and capricious); In re Application of Consumers Energy 
Co., 761 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (abuse of discretion). See generally Casey 
et al., supra note 43, at 287; Peters, supra note 13, at 243; Verkuil, supra note 43, at 687. 
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freely reviewable, (16) great deference, (17) great weight, (18) independent review, 
(19) manifest weight, (20) plenary, (21) rational basis, (22) reasonable basis, (23) 
respectful consideration, (24) serious consideration, (25) special deference, (26) 
substantial deference, (27) substantial weight, (28) sufficient evidence, (29) 
sufficient probative evidence, and (30) weight of evidence.103 As with state 
reviewing standards generally, most of these standards are merely variations or 
different formulations or expressions of the most commonly employed standards.104 
Nonetheless, the differing terminologies used make any comparative analysis of 
public utility commission reviewing standards particularly challenging, not to 
mention the imposition such variety of standards has on reviewing courts 
interpreting and applying them.  
The threshold inquiry in all appeals from public utility commission decisions is 
whether the public utility commission acted within the scope of its legal 
authority.105 This inquiry generally involves a determination of whether the public 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. See, e.g., Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke Cnty. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 668 
S.E.2d 296, 297 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (any evidence); Consol. Tel. Coop. v. W. Wireless 
Corp., 637 N.W.2d 699, 702 (N.D. 2001) (appreciable deference); Jackson Mobilphone Co. 
v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (clear error); 
McNeal v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 P.3d 442, 445 (Idaho 2006) (clear weight); Chase 
3000, Inc. v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 728 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Neb. 2007) (competent 
evidence); In re Application of Consumers Energy Co., 761 N.W.2d at 349 (competent and 
material substantial evidence); GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 790 (Fla. 2007) 
(competent substantial evidence); In re Pinetree Power, Inc., 871 A.2d 78, 80 (N.H. 2005) 
(considerable deference); Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 700 N.W.2d 768, 796 
(Wis. 2005) (due weight); In re Waikoloa Sanitary Sewer Co., 125 P.3d at 491 (freely 
reviewable); In re UPC Vt. Wind, LLC, 969 A.2d 144, 147 (Vt. 2009) (great deference); 
Clean Wis., Inc., 700 N.W. 2d at 795–96 (great weight); Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n, 904 N.E.2d 853, 857 (Ohio 2009) (independent review); id. (manifest 
weight); S. New England Tel. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 874 A.2d 776, 781 (Conn. 
2005) (plenary); Popowsky v. Pa. Pub. Util., 706 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. 1997) (rational 
basis); Dunn v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 246 S.W.3d 788, 791 (Tex. App. 2008) (reasonable 
basis); In re Application of Consumers Energy Co., 761 N.W.2d at 349 (respectful 
consideration); AEP Tex. Cent. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 286 S.W.3d 450, 460 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2008) (serious consideration); Equal Access Corp. v. Utils. Bd., 510 N.W.2d 147, 
151 (Iowa 1993) (special deference); Providence & Worcester R.R., 899 N.E.2d at 835 
(substantial deference); Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Gas Utils. of Ala., Inc., 678 So.2d 747, 
752 (Ala. 1996) (substantial weight); Constellation New Energy, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 825 A.2d 872, 880 (Del. Super. Ct. 2003) (sufficient evidence); Ohio Consumers’ 
Counsel, 904 N.E.2d at 856 (sufficient probative evidence); Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. 
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 883 N.E.2d 1035, 1039 (Ohio 2008) (weight of evidence).  
  104. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 105. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pub. Counsel v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 289 S.W.3d 240, 
246 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that review of public utility commission decisions begins 
with determining whether the decision was lawful which “turns on whether the Commission 
had the statutory authority to act as it did” (quoting Union Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
136 S.W.3d 146, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004))); Mountain Cmtys. for Responsible Energy v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 665 S.E.2d 315, 323 (W. Va. 2008) (stating that review of public utility 
commission decisions begins with determining “whether the Commission exceeded its 
statutory jurisdiction and powers” (quoting Cent. W. Va. Refuse, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
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utility commission acted within its jurisdiction and whether the public utility 
commission followed statutorily prescribed procedures.106 Whether a public utility 
commission exceeded the scope of its legal authority is reviewed de novo.107 
Notably, however, reviewing courts often entertain presumptions that the public 
utility commissions they are reviewing acted within their legal authority.108  
After resolving this threshold question, courts generally look to the type of 
question presented on appeal.109 The most commonly employed standard of review 
for questions of law is de novo review.110 However, at the same time, courts often 
differentiate between questions of law within the expertise of public utility 
commissions and those in which public utility commissions decide without 
employing their expertise.111 For instance, when a public utility commission issues 
a decision based on an interpretation of a statute that it is responsible for enforcing, 
courts often afford that decision a greater degree of deference.112 When public 
utility commissions employ their expertise in deciding questions of law, some 
                                                                                                                 
438 S.E.2d 596 (W. Va. 1993))). 
 106. See, e.g., Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. PSI Energy, Inc., 894 N.E.2d 1055, 
1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Kan. Indus. Consumers Grp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 138 P.3d 
338, 344 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
 107. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Stumbo v. Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 243 S.W.3d 
374, 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); In re Application of Consumers Energy Co., 761 N.W.2d at 
349. 
 108. See, e.g., GTC, Inc. v. Garcia, 791 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla. 2000) (“[O]rders of the 
Commission come before this Court clothed with the statutory presumption that they have 
been made within the Commission’s jurisdiction and powers, and that they are reasonable 
and just and such as ought to have been made.” (quoting United Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 496 So.2d 116, 118 (Fla. 1986))); Clipper Windpower, Inc. v. Sprenger, 924 A.2d 
1160, 1168 (Md. 2007) (stating that decisions of the public utility commission are prima 
facie correct unless clearly shown to be beyond the commission’s statutory authority or 
jurisdiction). 
 109. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 110. See, e.g., Ariz. Water Co. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 177 P.3d 1224, 1228 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2008); Nev. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 138 P.3d 486, 495 (Nev. 2006); Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 63 P.3d 887, 892 (Wyo. 2003). 
 111. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Regulatory Comm’n, 176 P.3d 667, 673 
(Alaska 2008) (“As to questions of law not implicating [the commission’s] special expertise, 
this court substitutes its own judgment. If [the commission] employs specialized expertise in 
a legal determination, the court applies a rational basis standard; [the commission’s] 
interpretation prevails over the court’s, so long as [it] is reasonable.”). Some courts further 
differentiate between questions of law that are questions of first impression or involve 
interpretation of statutes as opposed to administrative rules or regulations. See, e.g., S. New 
England Tel. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 874 A.2d 776, 781 (Conn. 2005) (“[W]hen a 
state agency’s determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial 
scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled to special deference.” (quoting Sweetman v. State 
Elections Enforcement Comm’n, 732 A.2d 144, 153 (Conn. 1999))); Alma Plantation v. La. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 685 So.2d 107, 110 (La. 1997) (“The Commission is entitled to 
deference in its interpretation of its own rules and regulations, though not in its interpretation 
of statutes and judicial decisions.”).  
 112. See, e.g., Providence & Worcester R.R. v. Energy Facilities Sitting Bd., 899 N.E.2d 
829, 835 (Mass. 2009); AEP Tex. Cent. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 286 S.W.3d 450, 460 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2008). 
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courts review under a rational basis standard;113 others simply give a varying 
degree of deference, including appreciable deference,114 great deference,115 or 
substantial deference.116 A small minority of courts review questions of law under 
entirely different standards, such as any evidence or abuse of discretion.117 
The most commonly employed standard of review for questions of fact is 
substantial evidence review.118 Variations of substantial evidence review are also 
used, such as competent substantial evidence119 and competent and material 
substantial evidence.120 The second most commonly used standard of review for 
factual determinations is clearly erroneous review.121 Seemingly unsure of which of 
the two most common standards of review to use (noting they are quite similar in 
any case),122 some courts employ them both.123 Other courts employ entirely 
different standards such as any evidence,124 clear weight of evidence,125 manifest 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp., 176 P.3d at 673. 
 114. See, e.g., Consol. Tel. Coop. v. W. Wireless Corp., 637 N.W.2d 699, 702 (N.D. 
2001). 
 115. See, e.g., GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007). 
 116. See, e.g., Providence & Worcester R.R., 899 N.E.2d at 835. 
 117. See, e.g., Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke Cnty. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 668 
S.E.2d 296, 297 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“We will affirm ‘if any evidence on the record 
substantiates the administrative agency’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.’” (quoting 
Prof’l Standards Comm. v. Alberson, 614 S.E.2d 132 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)) (additional 
internal quotation marks omitted)); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., 
725 P.2d 548, 553 (Mont. 1986) (“Conclusions of law are subject to an abuse of discretion 
review.” (quoting City of Billings v. Billings Firefighters Local No. 521, 651 P.2d 627, 632 
(Mont. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. In re Otter Tail Power Co., 744 
N.W.2d 594, 602 (S.D. 2008) (“The [public utility commission’s] findings of fact are 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, while its conclusions of law are reviewed de 
novo.”).  
 118. See, e.g., Dunn v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 890 A.2d 269, 270 (Me. 2006); Nev. Power 
Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 138 P.3d 486, 495 (Nev. 2006); Rohrbaugh v. Pa. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 727 A.2d 1080, 1084 (Pa. 1999).  
 119. See, e.g., GTC, Inc., 967 So.2d at 790; Kan. Indus. Consumers Grp. v. State Corp. 
Comm’n, 138 P.3d 338, 344 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). 
 120. See, e.g., In re Application of Consumers Energy Co., 761 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2008); State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Town of Kill Devil Hills, 670 S.E.2d 341, 347 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
 121. See, e.g., In re Waikoloa Sanitary Sewer Co., 125 P.3d 484, 491 (Haw. 2005); In re 
Otter Tail Power Co., 744 N.W.2d at 602; In re UPC Vt. Wind, LLC, 969 A.2d 144, 147 (Vt. 
2009). 
 122. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 123. See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., 725 P.2d 548, 
553 (Mont. 1986) (upholding a public utility commission decision if supported by substantial 
evidence while overturning a public utility commission decision if clearly erroneous); 
Kiawah Prop. Owners Grp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 593 S.E.2d 148, 151 (S.C. 2004) 
(upholding a public utility commission decision if not clearly erroneous in view of the 
substantial evidence on the whole record).  
 124. See, e.g., Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clarke Cnty. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 668 
S.E.2d 296, 297 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
 125. See, e.g., McNeal v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 P.3d 442, 445 (Idaho 2006).  
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weight of evidence,126 and weight of evidence.127 There is no predominant standard 
of review for mixed questions of law and fact, though mixed questions will 
generally be afforded a greater degree of deference than pure questions of law.128 
In addition to looking to the type of question presented on appeal, courts look to 
the role assumed by a public utility commission when it made the decision being 
appealed to determine the applicable standard of review on appeal.129 For instance, 
courts apply a different standard of review to decisions by public utility commissions 
when public utility commissions act in a legislative or administrative capacity as 
opposed to a judicial or adjudicatory capacity.130 When public utility commissions act 
in a legislative capacity, the most commonly employed standard of review is the 
abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious standard of review.131 Another 
common (and similar) standard of review is rational basis review.132 When public 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. See, e.g., Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 904 N.E.2d 853, 856 
(Ohio 2009). 
 127. See, e.g., Consol. Tel. Coop. v. W. Wireless Corp., 637 N.W.2d 699, 702 (N.D. 
2001). 
 128. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (Ind. 
2009) (“We therefore consider this question as a mixed question of law and fact with a high 
level of deference, examining the logic of the inferences made and the correctness of legal 
propositions without replacing our own judgment for that of the Commission.”); Clean Wis., 
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 700 N.W.2d 768, 796 (Wis. 2005) (“[W]e should defer to an 
agency interpretation when the ‘legal question is intertwined with factual determinations or 
with value or policy determinations’ and the agency involved ‘has primary responsibility for 
determination of fact and policy.’” (quoting Hutson v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 665 N.W.2d 212, 
221 (Wis. 2003)) (additional internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Casey et al., supra 
note 43, at 319. 
 129. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the various roles assumed by public utility 
commissions. 
 130. See, e.g., In re Request for Serv. in Qwest’s Tofte Exch., 666 N.W.2d 391, 395 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“When the [public utility commission] acts in a legislative capacity, 
the standard of review is whether it exceeded its statutory authority; when the [public utility 
commission] acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, the standard of review is the substantial 
evidence test.”); see also CAL. STATE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 20, at 2. 
 131. See, e.g., Chase 3000, Inc. v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 728 N.W.2d 560, 569 (Neb. 
2007) (“[W]here [an] order [is] administrative or legislative in character, the only issues to 
be determined by the reviewing court [are] whether the Commission acted within the scope 
of its authority and whether the order complained of is reasonable and not arbitrarily 
made.”); Potomac Edison Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 667 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2008) 
(“When the Commission has acted in [a] legislative capacity and has not based its decision 
on the resolution of an issue of law, we will set aside the Commission’s decision only if the 
Commission clearly has abused its legislative discretion.”); see also CAL. STATE AUDITOR 
REPORT, supra note 20, at 2. 
 132. See, e.g., N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 731 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (N.Y. 2000) 
(“[D]eterminations in setting just and reasonable rates . . . ‘may not be set aside unless they 
are without rational basis’ . . . because ‘setting utility rates presents problems of a highly 
technical nature, the solutions to which . . . have been left by the Legislature to the expertise 
of the [public utility commission].’” (quoting In re Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 660 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (N.Y. 1995))); In re Abrams v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 492 
N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (N.Y. 1986) (additional internal quotation marks omitted); Popowsky v. 
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utility commissions act in a judicial capacity, the most commonly employed standard 
of review is substantial evidence review.133  
In general, courts use the abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious 
standards of review as catchalls whether or not the particular decisions or actions of 
a public utility commission fit within one of the other categories defined by a 
different standard of review.134  
C. A Three-Tiered, Two-Standard Reviewing Approach 
This Note proposes a three-tiered, two-standard reviewing approach for 
determining the appropriate level of deference to be afforded public utility 
commissions as they undergo judicial review by appellate courts. The purpose of 
this 3-2 approach is to simplify and clarify the standard-of-review determinations 
that state courts continue to grapple with in the context of appeals from public 
utility commission decisions. The 3-2 approach is both a reflection and a 
refinement of current public utility commission reviewing standards. The 3-2 
approach utilizes three tiers of review to properly characterize the public utility 
commission decision and two standards of review to reflect the legal consequences 
of that characterization. 
The three tiers of review reflect in large part the most common classifications 
used by state courts in reviewing public utility commission decisions.135 First, 
courts should inquire whether the public utility commission exceeded the scope of 
its legal authority; second, whether the public utility commission was acting in a 
legislative, judicial, or otherwise administrative capacity; and third, if the public 
utility commission was acting in a judicial capacity, whether the issue on appeal is 
a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact, according 
degrees of deference depending on the extent of expertise employed by the 
commission.  
The two standards of review require courts at each level of review to ask one of 
two questions: was the action or decision of the public utility commission right, or 
was it reasonable? These “right” and “reasonable” standards replicate the degrees 
of deference found in the most common standards used by state courts in reviewing 
public utility commission decisions, although without the many cumbersome 
distinctions.136 Although most appellate courts attribute deference on a spectrum 
                                                                                                                 
Pa. Pub. Util., 706 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. 1997) (“As long as there is a rational basis for the 
[public utility commission’s] methodology [in establishing a rate structure], such decisions 
are left entirely up to the discretion of the [public utility commission] which, using its 
expertise, is the only one which can properly determine which method is the most 
accurate . . . .” (second alteration in original) (quoting W. Penn Power Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 607 A.2d 1132, 1135 (Pa. 1992))). 
 133. See, e.g., In re Request for Serv. in Qwest’s Tofte Exch., 666 N.W.2d at 391, 395; 
CAL. STATE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 20, at 2. 
 134. See, e.g., AEP Tex. Cent. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 286 S.W.3d 450, 468 (Tex. 
App. 2008) (stating that a public utility commission decision will be overturned if not 
supported by substantial evidence, if arbitrary or capricious, or if characterized by an abuse 
of discretion). 
 135. See supra Part III.B. 
 136. Compare Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Regulatory Comm’n, 176 P.3d 667, 673 
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with three or four points (i.e., three or four standards), exerting, for instance, hard 
review (de novo), medium review (substantial evidence), or low review (arbitrary 
and capricious),137 if the distinctions are not carefully drawn and defined then they 
cannot be applied, and in the context of public utility commissions, where 
comparative-advantage principles play such a prominent role, such distinctions are 
probably unnecessary in any case.  
No deference should be given to a public utility commission when the question 
before the reviewing court is whether the public utility commission exceeded the 
scope of its legal authority.138 The legal authority of public utility commissions 
derives from statutes promulgated by state legislatures and must, therefore, be 
exercised within the confines of those statutes.139 While a reviewing court may 
entertain a presumption that the public utility commission acted within its legal 
authority, it must nonetheless find the public utility commission was right in its 
exercise of its legal authority, as opposed to merely being reasonable.140  
If the public utility commission acted within its legal authority, courts should 
then progress to the second tier of review, which requires a determination of 
whether the public utility commission was acting in a legislative, judicial, or 
otherwise administrative capacity.141 When a public utility commission acts in a 
legislative capacity, a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of 
the commission, but uphold its decision so long as it is reasonable, even if in the 
view of the court it is wrong.142 When a public utility commission acts in a 
legislative capacity, it is acting as an extension of the legislature and should, 
therefore, be accorded a higher degree of deference than when acting in a judicial 
capacity.143  
If the public utility commission acted in a judicial capacity in rendering its 
decision, the reviewing court should then progress to the third and final tier of 
                                                                                                                 
(Alaska 2008) (defining substantial evidence as “relevant evidence that a reasonable person 
might accept as adequate to support [the decision]”), with Kan. Indus. Consumers Grp. v. 
State Corp. Comm’n, 138 P.3d 338, 344 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (describing decisions as 
arbitrary and capricious when they are unreasonable), and In re Application of Consumers 
Energy Co., 761 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (defining abuse of discretion as 
occurring when decisions fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes).  
 137. Casey et al., supra note 43, at 287 (“[T]he four standards of review, arrayed in order 
of increasing deference . . . include: de novo review (is the decision right?), clearly erroneous 
review (is the decision wrong?), review for substantial evidence (is the decision 
unreasonable?), and review for abuse of discretion (is the decision irrational?).”). 
 138. See supra note 107. 
 139. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the legal authority of public utility 
commissions.  
 140. See supra notes 107–08. 
 141. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the various roles assumed by public utility 
commissions. It may not always be clear whether a public utility commission was acting in a 
legislative capacity or a judicial capacity when it rendered its decision. See In re Request for 
Serv. in Qwest’s Tofte Exch., 666 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). When public 
utility commissions act in both capacities (e.g., when public utility commissions conduct 
hearings and render findings of fact and conclusions of law in issuing rules or regulations), 
courts should proceed to the third tier of review. 
 142. See supra notes 130–33.  
 143. See supra notes 130–33.  
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review, which requires a determination of whether the question presented on appeal 
is a question of law, question of fact, or mixed question of law and fact.144 The 
expertise employed by a public utility commission in making its decision will have 
the greatest effect at this stage of analysis.145 In differentiating between the varying 
levels of deference to be afforded under these “three conventional labels,” it is 
important to recognize that they are classifications meant to reflect the fact that 
deference to lower courts and agencies depends on whether “they [are] in a better 
position to address a question than the appellate court would be.”146 Questions of 
law are generally reviewed without deference because appellate courts are in just as 
good a position to decide them as lower courts or agencies, but where that is not the 
case, deference may be warranted.147  
The extent of expertise employed by public utility commissions in rendering 
decisions is a good proxy for determining whether they are in a better position to 
resolve the dispute. Public utility commissions are fact-finding bodies with the 
technical expertise to administer the variety of regulatory schemes devised by state 
legislatures.148 When public utility commissions employ their expertise, whether in 
deciding a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact, 
their actions should be reviewed for reasonableness to the extent of their expertise 
(i.e., to the extent they are better positioned to decide the issue under review). In 
other words, while questions of law should generally be reviewed for rightness, if 
the question falls within the public utility commission’s expertise, it should be 
reviewed only for reasonableness.149 On the other hand, questions of fact should 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. See supra Part II.D for a discussion of the types of questions presented on appeal.  
 145. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Regulatory Comm’n, 176 P.3d 667, 673 
(Alaska 2008) (“As to questions of law not implicating [the commission’s] special expertise, 
this court substitutes its own judgment. If [the commission] employs specialized expertise in 
a legal determination, the court applies a rational basis standard; [the commission’s] 
interpretation prevails over the court’s, so long as [it] is reasonable.”); N.M. Indus. Energy 
Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 168 P.3d 105, 110 (N.M. 2007) (“In 
reviewing the Commission’s decision, we ‘begin by looking at two interconnected factors: 
whether the decision presents a question of law, a question of fact, or some combination of 
the two; and whether the matter is within the agency’s specialized field of expertise.’” 
(quoting Morningstar Water Users Ass’n v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 904 P.2d 28, 31 (N.M. 
1995))); AEP Tex. Cent. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 286 S.W.3d 450, 468 (Tex. App. 2008) 
(“While presuming that the Commission’s order is valid and that ‘its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, and decisions are supported by substantial evidence,’ we also ‘give significant 
deference to the [Commission] in its field of expertise.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 246 S.W.3d 324, 331 (Tex. App. 2008))). 
 146. Hofer, supra note 73, at 231, 241–42; see also Casey et al., supra note 43, at 316–
17.  
 147. See supra notes 110–11. 
 148. See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (Ind. 2009). 
 149. See, e.g., GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007) (“[W]hen a statutory 
term is subject to varying interpretations and that statute has been interpreted by the 
executive agency charged with enforcing the statute, this Court follows a deferential 
principle of statutory construction . . . .”); Quiland, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 956 A.2d 
127, 131 (Me. 2008) (“[W]e either review the Commission's construction of the ambiguous 
statute for reasonableness or plainly construe the unambiguous statute.” (quoting 
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almost always be reviewed for reasonableness because public utility commissions 
almost always employ their expertise in deciding them.150 Appellate courts can 
apply the same analysis to mixed questions: after separating the legal and factual 
elements, they can apply rightness review for the legal elements and reasonableness 
review for the factual ones.151 In close cases involving mixed questions of law and 
fact, it may be beneficial to reject the labels altogether and simply resort to 
deciding whether the public utility commission is better positioned to decide the 
question.152  
The 3-2 approach outlined above helps explain why the applicable standard of 
review in Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. United States Steel Corp.,153 
referenced in the Introduction to this Note, was so contested. Because the case 
involved a grant of summary judgment concerning interpretation of a contract for 
electricity, the Indiana Court of Appeals treated the case as one involving a 
question of law not within the expertise of the Indiana Utility Regulatory 
Commission.154 The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the 
Commission “deployed its expertise in the subject matter” by in effect 
“interpret[ing] its own order,” as the contract had to be and was approved by the 
Commission when the parties entered into it.155 Thus, according to the Indiana 
Supreme Court, in making its decision, the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission 
acted within its legal authority (the first tier) in an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial 
capacity (the second tier) when it decided a mixed question of law and fact while 
employing its expertise (the third tier).156  
The outcome of this case may well have been different if the Commission had 
decided a pure question of law as opposed to a mixed question, or had decided the 
case without employing its expertise.157 The Indiana Supreme Court’s 
determination that the Commission’s decision was a mixed question of law and fact 
within the expertise of the Commission tipped the level of deference in favor of the 
Commission,158 as it would under the 3-2 reviewing approach. After all, the 
Commission was in a better position to decide the dispute; it had approved the 
contract in dispute.159 The Indiana Supreme Court sought to determine whether the 
Commission’s decision was reasonable while the Indiana Court of Appeals sought 
                                                                                                                 
Competitive Energy Servs., LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 818 A.2d 1039, 1046 (Me. 2003))); 
see also supra notes 110–11. 
 150. See, e.g., Popowsky v. Pa. Pub. Util., 706 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. 1997) (recognizing 
the public utility commission’s expertise and role as fact finder). 
 151. See Casey et al., supra note 43, at 318–19 (“One approach to mixed questions 
avoids generalizations about the application of law to facts; it breaks the mixed questions 
down into unmixed halves of fact and law.”). 
 152. See generally Hofer, supra note 73. 
 153. 907 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. 2009).  
 154. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 881 N.E.2d 1065, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008), vacated, 907 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. 2009). 
 155. See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 907 N.E.2d at 1017–18. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at 1018. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. at 1017–18. 
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to determine whether the Commission’s decision was right.160 The difference 
between the two made all the difference.  
CONCLUSION 
Public utility commission reviewing standards are being litigated in courts 
across the country. While standards of review may seem unimportant in the 
abstract, in reality, they can have a huge effect, especially in the context of judicial 
review of public utility commissions. The three-tiered, two-standard reviewing 
approach advocated by this Note reflects on current public utility commission 
reviewing standards in suggesting a refined reviewing approach for determining the 
appropriate level of deference to be afforded public utility commissions as they 
undergo judicial review. Clearly articulated reviewing rationales are a necessity 
because the policy objectives served by standards of review cannot be achieved 
without them. Unfortunately, such rationales are all-too-often missing, or if present, 
simply too confusing.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. Compare id. at 1018, with N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 881 N.E.2d 
1065, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

